



A systemic methodology for risk management in healthcare sector / Cagliano A.C.; Grimaldi S.; Rafele C.. - In: SAFETY
SCIENCE. - ISSN 0925-7535. - STAMPA. - 49:5(2011), pp. 695-708.
Original







(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2371072 since:
Elsevier
  1
A systemic methodology for risk management in healthcare sector 
 
Anna Corinna Cagliano, Ph.D.a 
Sabrina Grimaldi, Assistant Professorb 
Carlo Rafele, Associate Professorc  
 
a corresponding author 
Department of Production Systems and Business Economics, Politecnico di Torino, corso 
Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy. Telephone: +39 0110907206. Fax: +39 
0110907299. E-mail: anna.cagliano@polito.it    
bDepartment of Production Systems and Business Economics, Politecnico di Torino, corso 
Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy. Telephone: +39 0110907289. Fax: +39 
0110907299. E-mail: sabrina.grimaldi@polito.it    
cDepartment of Production Systems and Business Economics, Politecnico di Torino, corso 
Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy. Telephone: +39 0110907286. Fax: +39 














The recent biomedical, technological, and normative changes have led healthcare 
organizations to the implementation of clinical governance as a way to ensure the best quality 
of care in an increasingly complex environment. Risk management is one of the most 
relevant aspects of clinical governance and approaches put forward in literature highlight the 
necessity to perform comprehensive analyses intended to uncover root causes of adverse 
events.  
Contributing to this field, the present paper applies Reason’s theory of failures to work out a 
systemic methodology to study risks impacting not only directly but also indirectly on 
patients. Also, the steps of such approach are organized around Human Reliability 
Assessment phases, in order to take into account the human component of healthcare 
systems. This framework is able to foster effective decision making about reducing failures 
and waste and to improve healthcare organizations’ maturity towards risk management.        
The developed methodology is applied to the pharmacy department of a large Italian hospital. 
An extensive validation in different healthcare settings is required to fully prove benefits and 
limitations.             
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1. Introduction 
In recent years healthcare systems have been involved in a number of different changes, 
ranging from technological to normative ones, all asking for increased efficiency. In addition, 
the biomedical progress in the last decades has contributed to raise the level of organizational 
complexity in hospitals, which is given by many different factors, such as multiple 
professional experiences, non uniform management models, patient specificity, surgery 
complexity, reduced inpatient days, and a growing number of healthcare service users due to 
an increase in average lifetime.  As a result, medicine complexity, driven by innovations in 
both science and technology, stresses the need for new managerial models (Bridges, 2006). 
Thus, this context highlights the necessity to develop systemic approaches able to detect 
waste and errors and to suggest organizational and/or technological solutions for continuous 
improvement.  
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To this end, following the success of the application of  Kaizen principles to the 
manufacturing sector (Liker, 2004; Liker and Hoseus, 2008), international healthcare 
organizations, such as The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
and The World Health Organization, have developed and adopted the concept of clinical 
governance. Clinical governance aims to ensure that patients receive the best quality of care. 
It includes systems and processes for monitoring and improving services, risk management, 
clinical audit, clinical effectiveness programs, staff management, education training and 
continuous personal development, and the use of information to support healthcare delivery 
(Sale, 2005). Among the different aspects of clinical governance, risk management is crucial 
since it addresses the clinical risk impacting on patients. Literature shows that clinical risk 
management does not always take a systemic perspective. Moreover, it does often not rely on 
the understanding of people acting in the investigated processes, nor gives it a valuable 
support to decision making.   
This paper operationalizes Reason’s theory of failures by developing a methodology to 
investigate healthcare processes and related risks impacting either directly or indirectly on 
patients.  
The work provides a systemic approach based on expert knowledge and able to sustain 
continuous improvement. With the purpose of explaining how it works, the methodology is 
applied to the pharmacy department of a large hospital. However, more case studies are 
needed to completely assess the relevance of the framework to the healthcare sector.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the need for a systemic perspective on 
healthcare risk and presents Reason’s theory of latent failures. Section 3 discusses the 
importance of errors to clinical risk, as well as the features characterizing a successful 
methodology for managing it. The proposed methodology and its application are presented in 
Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. Benefits and limitations of the approach, together with 









2. Healthcare risk: need for a systemic perspective  
Similarly to any other complex system, the complexity of healthcare systems generates 
adverse events if not controlled (Vincent, 2006). An adverse event may be defined as an 
unintended injury or complication resulting in disability, death or prolonged hospital stay that 
is caused by healthcare management rather than by the patient’s underlying disease process 
(Ross Baker et al., 2004). An intrinsic characteristic of medical care is the fact that, whenever 
it is delivered, patients run the risk to suffer from a disease as an unwilling consequence of 
treatments (Thomas et al., 2000). Thus, the probability of errors and adverse events in general 
cannot be eliminated in healthcare organizations. However, it can be controlled by the 
application to risk management phases of a recursive process of continuous improvement 
inspired by the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) paradigm (Tonneau, 1997). According to The 
Project Management Institute, risk management includes the processes concerned with risk 
management planning, identification, analysis, response, monitoring, and control. The aim is 
to increase the probabilities and impacts of positive events and to decrease the probabilities 
and impacts related to adverse events (Project Management Institute, 2004). Risk 
management has been adopted to cover all healthcare risks, both clinical and non clinical 
ones. 
The present work focuses on clinical risk, which has been defined by different authors. 
Wilson and Tingle refer to clinical risk as clinical error to be at variance from intended 
treatment, care, therapeutic intervention or diagnostic result (Sale, 2005). Kohn, Corrigan, 
and Donaldson (1999) define clinical risk as the probability that a patient is affected by an 
adverse event voluntarily or involuntarily caused by medical treatments. However, clinical 
risk is not only due to medical activities directly impacting on patients but it is reliant on a 
larger set of activities and professionals. It can be determined by many factors relating to the 
system, the environment, and the interplay of individuals operating in the processes 
connected to the delivery of care (Kohn et al., 1999). This research takes such broader 
perspective on clinical risk, including all events that may affect patients’ safety both directly 
and indirectly.  
Within clinical risk, medical errors are particularly important since they may occur during 
multiple hospital processes, from therapy prescription, thorough preparation, distribution, and 
administration (Vincent, 2001). Several studies performed in US, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Europe (Davis et al., 2001; Leape et al., 1991; Vincent et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 1995) 
reveal that about fifty percent of adverse events taking place in healthcare systems may be 
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prevented. This highlights a strong need for understanding the triggering events of medical 
errors as well as their correlations in order to decrease the probability of occurrence of these 
errors by working on all their possible causes. 
The theory of latent failures put forward by Reason is relevant to this end (Reason, 2002). 
According to such author, adverse events are seldom determined by a single error, being it 
either human or technological, but more often they are the result of a chain of errors and 
events where the person responsible for the final error is only the last causal link. In other 
words, adverse events are produced by many factors, such as organizational, professional, 
personal, and technical ones. Reason’s model defines an adverse event as an unexpected 
release of energy that may be prevented by erecting barriers between the source of energy 
and the person or the object to be protected (Figure 1). In this situation, the word “barrier” 
refers to a wide range of preventive/protective measures including protection devices, 
security systems, working procedures, training, supervision, and emergency plans (Harms-
Ringdahl, 2009). When there are deficiencies in these barriers, they are not able to block the 
unexpected flow of energy and originate an adverse event that may be classified as a “near 
miss” (almost an event), an “incident” (event without damage), or an “accident” (event with 
damage) according to its severity (Hollnagel, 2004). Deficiencies are represented by latent 
and active failures (Reason, 2001). On the one hand, latent failures alone are not able to cause 
full-blown symptoms, only if connected to other factors and under facilitating conditions they 
originate adverse events. On the other hand, active failures represent immediate triggering 
events, they are related to people acting in a system and their detection often implies the 
identification of an individual responsibility.  
 
Take in Fig. 1. Reason’s model (adapted from Barach, 2002) 
 
The existence of both direct and indirect causes for adverse events in any social-technological  
complex system, as highlighted by Reason’s theory, stresses the need for taking a systemic 
perspective to risk, in order to have a global view on how the interrelations among technical, 
human, and organizational factors cause or prevent negative events. This necessity is even 
more evident for clinical risk, since healthcare systems are human intensive and their ultimate 
goal is providing a medical service ensuring the safety of the entire population.        
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3. Managing clinical risk by working on errors  
A systemic perspective is not the only feature characterizing a successful methodology for 
managing clinical risk. Preventing risk requires to understand how to strengthen those 
procedural, administrative, physical, and individual barriers intercepting and blocking the 
energy flow responsible for deviations. To this end, it is useful to work on what constitutes 
such energy flow, that is, according to Reason’s theory, on errors. 
Error taxonomies put forward in literature provide relevant insights on how to cope with 
adverse events occurring in the healthcare sector. Several classifications of errors have been 
developed (Baysari et al., 2008; Baysari et al., 2009; Cosby, 2003; Shorrock, 2002; Wieman 
and Wieman, 2004). Among them, Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA) is one of the 
most detailed (Embrey, 1992; Hollnagel, 1998). PHEA groups error modes according to the 
following activities: planning, execution, control, information retrieval, communication, and 
selection. For example, in a healthcare setting, prescription errors may be related to planning, 
if the proper drug is not prescribed, to execution, if physicians’ handwriting is not easy to be 
interpreted, or to communication, if errors occur when transcribing therapies.  This scheme 
suggests that errors usually have roots grounded in different areas, thus assuming multiple 
viewpoints is essential to manage them. 
Our research builds on Lucas (1997) and Reason’s (2001) perspectives for approaching error 
reduction. These authors look at errors by taking into account four dimensions, namely 
organizational (systemic), individual, technical, and psychological ones. The present work 
focuses only on the first three perspectives since the last one is related to merely 
psychological issues. 
The organizational perspective states that error determinants are to be found within the 
system at issue. To be more precise, errors are made by people but their behaviours are highly 
influenced by the working environment and the organizational processes. Active failures, 
such as cognitive, skill set (interpretive and procedural), task-based and personal impairment 
(Cosby, 2003), have to be traced back to latent failures residing for instance in planning and 
working procedures (e.g. poor shift programming exposing anaesthetists to many consecutive 
working hours, with the consequent risk of a decreased level of attention; lacking of 
integration among informative systems leading to scarce communication among the actors of 
the healthcare delivery process).                
The individual perspective focuses on the characteristics of people responsible for errors, 
such as motivation, personality, and interpersonal relationships. Also, it encourages learning 
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from errors by discussing them and communicating possible safety problems and adverse 
events (McDonald and Mayer, 2008). Thus, this perspective stimulates the emergence of the 
experience developed by people while working in a given system, of the “big message” 
coming from experts. In other words, such perspective promotes expert knowledge 
elicitation, a formal process of obtaining information able to make a person’s knowledge and 
believes explicit (Garthwaite et al., 2005). Expert knowledge elicitation has been widely 
applied not only to risk identification but also to risk assessment being translated into 
probability distributions (O’Hagan and Oakley, 2004). In a healthcare system, characterized 
by human-based activities, managing criticalities by means of an individual perspective 
allows to fortify barriers against the flow of energy associated with adverse events. In this 
case, experts are represented by nurses, physicians, radiographers, pharmacists, receptionists, 
cleaners, porters or other professional figures.                 
Finally, according to the technical perspective, adverse event reduction can only be pursued 
by means of strong automation, because the technical components of a system are more 
reliable than human beings (Lucas, 1997). However, similarly to what happened in the 
manufacturing industry about forty years ago (Janssen et al., 1995; Norman, 1990), 
healthcare systems require a gradual introduction of technological innovations such as 
Computer Physician Order Entry or Electronic Patient Records. Technology is a powerful 
tool to increase safety in healthcare processes, but without a well structured organization it 
may make existing working practices more complicated, resulting in fewer benefits than 
expected. Therefore, an accurate analysis of processes to understand criticalities and waste is 
necessary before their reengineering through technology.        
The relevance of Lucas and Reason’s approach has been witnessed by many authors (Harms-
Ringdahl, 2009; Henriksen et al., 2008; Paz Barroso and Wilson, 2000; Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2001). However, adopting one of these perspectives alone is not so beneficial. 
Instead, a combination among the first three ones leads to an effective methodology to 
clinical risk management. Thanks to the individual perspective, human resources will make 
emerge that sunk information necessary to adopt a systemic standpoint and to comprehend 
the links between causes and effects of adverse events. This enables the definition of 
appropriate measures for error reduction, also based on technical innovation.  
The present work suggests a risk management methodology integrating all the three error 
perspectives by Lucas and Reason into an inductive approach able to perform a 
  8
comprehensive investigation of clinical processes in order to identify criticalities 
(ineffectiveness) and waste (inefficiency).    
 
4. A systemic methodology for clinical risk management 
4.1 Overview of the methodology  
Lucas and Reason’s perspectives to error reduction allow to describe the relevant 
characteristics of our methodology: 
 The suggested approach complies with the organizational/systemic perspective since 
it first identifies the most critical parts of the entire clinical system as well as those 
barriers that are most vulnerable and prone to cause adverse events. After that, the 
methodology focuses on a specific healthcare process and on the analysis of the 
associated criticalities, in order to identify, assess, and control risks related to the 
activities of such process both directly and indirectly impacting on patients.  
 The individual perspective is assured by involving the actors of the investigated 
process in every step of the methodology, in order to create that background of 
information necessary to handle all risk management phases.  
 The technical perspective is addressed since our methodology supports decision 
making in order to define the most effective and efficient organizational and/or 
technological improvements, according to the maturity of single organizations 
towards risk.  
The practical translation of these features was inspired by Human Reliability Assessment 
(HRA), an approach aimed to identify errors and weaknesses by examining both a system and 
people working in it. HRA takes a systemic perspective by looking at the human contribution 
to technical and organisational settings (Embrey, 2000). In this way, it provides a class of 
techniques that are very powerful to improve reliability and safety in the healthcare sector.  
The main phases of HRA include data collection, task description, task simulation, human 
error identification and analysis, and human error quantification (Lyons et al., 2004). 
Following them, we propose a methodology structured according to four progressive steps, 
namely:      
1. Context analysis. 
2. Process mapping. 
3. Risk identification and assessment. 
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4. Failure modes and waste analysis (FMEA-Waste analysis). 
Our methodology integrates and organizes project, risk, and waste management approaches, 
thus enabling them to contribute to a systemic analysis of risk, which is not possible when 
they are applied in isolation. It is important to highlight that a project and a process have 
resembling structures, even though a project is temporary and unique while a process is 
usually ongoing and repetitive (Project Management Institute, 2004). As a matter of fact, a 
project may be defined as a set of activities aimed to produce a given outcome (Harvard 
Business School, 2004) and a process is a set of interrelated activities whose goal is 
transforming inputs to create outputs (Johansson et al., 1993). In the case of healthcare 
processes the activities will be directed towards the correct delivery of care to patients. 
Therefore, the similarity of structure between a project and a process allows us to apply 
project management tools to the investigation of risk in healthcare processes. In addition, 
healthcare processes are characterised by several cross-functional projects, such as those 
related to innovation. Furthermore, the fourth step of the methodology makes use of a HRA 
technique, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), which is by far one of the most 
extensively adopted in the healthcare sector in the last decades. It has been employed in many 
fields, such as reducing risk in blood transfusions (Burgmeier, 2002), intravenous drug 
infusions (Apkon et al., 2004), improving drug distribution systems (Lyons, 2009; McNally 
et al., 1997), and drug prescription in hospitals (Saizy-Callaert et al., 2001). Moreover, 
FMEA has been recently endorsed by the healthcare industry and the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations as a tool for reducing risk to patients (Brown et al., 
2008; Ookalkar et al., 2009; Stalhandske et al., 2003). 
The following section gives a detailed description of each step of the developed 
methodology. 
 
4.2 Description of the steps of the methodology  
1. Context analysis 
Context analysis is aimed to select and become familiar with the critical healthcare process to 
be investigated. Also, this is the phase when the various actors responsible for the process at 
issue get involved into the working group committed to perform the analysis.  
Thanks to expert knowledge elicitation and careful consideration of documents, such as 
working procedures, organizational charts, responsibility maps, and shift plans, the working 
team gets a first knowledge of process activities and related flows of both quantitative data 
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and clinical and organizational information. This forms the base for the identification of 
criticalities, which are investigated more in depth by means of two of the traditional tools 
employed in risk identification: checklists and interviews (Grimaldi and Rafele, 2008). 
Checklists are a useful way of keeping trace of the lessons learnt from previous events and 
may be purposefully employed in self-assessment processes and reviews (Bartlett et al., 
2004). On the other hand, interviews are often used for risk identification sessions when it is 
not possible to make the working team meet together. They are usually conducted into a 
confidential environment, where the interviewee is encouraged to express his idea honestly 
and without fear of reprisal or blame.     
 
2.  Process mapping 
In this second step of the methodology, typical project risk management tools are used to 
obtain a more in depth definition of single process activities, also including the identification 
of actors in charge for them. The process is divided into phases that are analysed and in turn 
decomposed into activities, until a satisfactory level of detail has not been reached. In order 
to accomplish this task effectively, the Activity Breakdown Structure (ABS) may be used. 
The ABS is a tree structure coming from the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) (Project 
Management Institute, 2001), but it is process-oriented instead of being product-oriented. The 
lowest level of the ABS contains elementary process activities. However, since WBS and 
ABS have been developed in the context of project planning, they lack the time dimension. 
Therefore, this has been included in the proposed methodology by making use of process 
flow charts (Graham, 2004). Flow charts allow to locate activities in the lowest ABS level 
according to a logical-time sequence by means of priority links. In addition, activities in a 
flow chart may be spatially placed within a matrix structure where horizontal lanes represent 
different process phases and vertical lanes correspond to actors performing activities. This 
structure is called cross-functional flow chart (Damelio, 1996). 
All the pieces of information related to single activities represented by flow charts are 
summed up by process sheets (Figure 2). These tables contain the following details: 
 
 name or code of both process phase and activity at issue; 
 actors performing the activity; 
 inputs (information, materials, preliminary actions, orders, etc.); 
 detailed description of operations required by the activity; 
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 duration and frequency; 
 controls to monitor activity progress; 
 tools necessary to perform both the activity and related controls; 
 outputs (other activities, information, and data).       
     
Take in Fig. 2. Process sheet 
 
3. Risk identification and assessment 
The third phase of the proposed approach moves from the understanding of the analysed 
process to the identification of related risks, again by using project risk management tools.    
First of all, risk sources are identified by using the Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS), defined 
as a source-oriented grouping of project risks that organizes and defines the total risk 
exposure of the project. Each descending level represents an increasingly detailed definition 
of sources of risk to the project (Hillson, 2002; Project Management Institute, 2004). In the 
present methodology RBS levels are determined based on the knowledge of the process at 
issue gained during the first two steps, Context analysis and Process mapping, and also 
according to the experience of the members of the working team. The number of levels 
should be set so that the RBS is both comprehensive, that is it includes all possible risk 
sources, and easy to understand and use to control risks.     
A first general classification divides risk sources into internal and external ones. The risk 
sources in the first class may be successfully prevented and managed, whereas those in the 
second class are out of the process actors’ control and can be treated only with assurance 
coverage or by avoiding them, for example by modifying activities where they may occur. 
Internal risk sources are of particular importance since they can be controlled. According to 
Roth (1993), they originate from those elements representing the foundations of a healthcare 
delivery system. These are related to the three processes enabling healthcare systems to 
transform inputs into outputs, namely clinical, management, and ancillary processes (Vissers, 
1998) (Figure 3).         
 
Take in Fig. 3. Roth’s model (adapted from Roth, 1993)   
 
Roth’s model has been used in this work as a guide to find out the main areas of a healthcare 
delivery system where internal risk sources could be identified:  
  12
  human resources, with their various tasks, their individual knowledge and 
professional skills. They operate in a specific organizational structure able to plan 
and program the activities forming clinical processes; 
  physical and technological supports used by resources to perform their activities. 
They may be either medical or related to information or plant technology; 
  communication/information, as the basis of the relationships among resources and 
between them and technological supports. It plays a strategic role in managing 
healthcare complexity. In fact, similarly to any other complex system (Gandolfi, 
1999), in the healthcare one interactions among professionals are more important 
than individual competencies and activities to determine the success of a clinical 
treatment; 
  physical structure, with all the tools necessary to support clinical, technological, and 
managerial processes within a healthcare delivery system.             
It can also be noticed that there is a correlation between the foundations of a healthcare 
delivery system and the barriers required to intercept and block adverse events according to 
Reason’s theory. As a matter of fact, adverse events are caused by the simultaneous action of 
deficiencies in the different processes characterizing a healthcare delivery system. Therefore, 
by integrating both Roth’s and Reason’s theories, the barriers existing in a generic healthcare 
system may be classified as follows: 
 O – Organization;  
 T – Technology;  
 C – Communication;  
 S – Structure. 
These represent the macro areas forming the second RBS level as far as internal risk sources 
are concerned (Figure 4). 
 
Take in Fig. 4. RBS structure 
 
The risk sources in the lowest RBS level are linked to the activities in the lowest ABS level 
by means of the Risk Breakdown Matrix (RBM) (Hillson, 2003; Hillson at al., 2006). The 
RBM allows for risk identification by simply putting crosses into its cells meaning that given 
risk sources impact on given activities. 
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As a further step, depending on the quantity of information elicited from experts, risk 
evaluation is performed by estimating probabilities of occurrence and impacts with either 
qualitative or quantitative scales. The first time the proposed methodology is applied to a 
case, available information will not be sufficient to make a quantitative risk evaluation viable. 
Only after iterating the present method a number of times, a healthcare organization will have 
developed that risk culture making possible to deepen the analysis through quantitative 
techniques such as reactive (after an adverse event) or proactive (before an adverse event) 
indicators (Körvers and Sonnemans, 2008).   
The RBM gives a classification of risky events enabling to select the most critical ones, 
which require a more detailed analysis in order to define an adequate risk response supporting 
continuous improvement efforts.  For this purpose, the proposed methodology integrates 
FMEA as a Human Reliability Assessment technique (Lyons et al., 2004) to further 
investigate the critical links among risk sources and activities.  
 
4. Failure modes and waste analysis (FMEA-Waste analysis) 
Even if a great number of sheet structures to support FMEA have been proposed in literature, 
the present methodology suggests specific FMEA tables in order to have a more effective 
integration among FMEA and the RBM. Such tables have been conceived with the aim of 
highlighting not only the ineffectiveness of a system but also its inefficiency. To this end, the 
study of failure modes has been enhanced by a waste analysis driven by the seven classes of 
waste defined by the Toyota Production System (Ohno, 1988). These sources of waste have 
been adapted to healthcare process analysis (Gray, 2007; Zidel, 2006) as follows:  
 Overproduction: doing more than customer requirements. For example, a similar 
behaviour may be a consequence of mixing drugs in anticipation of patient needs or of 
hospitalizing patients when they could be given medical care at their homes.  
 Waiting times: whenever no activity is performed, waiting for the next event 
happening, such as waiting for bed assignment, waiting for discharge, waiting for 
treatment, waiting for diagnostic tests, waiting for supplies, waiting for approval, 
waiting for a physician or a nurse, and long waiting times between cases in operating 
rooms. 
 Transportation: moving medications, patients, and supplies without adding value to 
the process.   
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 Overprocessing: performing unnecessary activities leading to an inefficient use of 
resources, with the consequence of rising process costs. Examples of such behaviour 
include using high skilled resources for repetitive activities that could be performed 
by less trained people, employing unnecessary auxiliary staff, such as technical, 
catering or laundry personnel, conducting redundant tests, and subjecting patients to 
multiple bed moves. 
 Queues/Stock: everything waiting for an event, thus increasing costs and taking up 
room, such as medical devices, drugs, and other materials bought by specific 
departments and stocked for a long time, patients in emergency departments waiting 
for hospitalization, patients waiting for undergoing diagnostic tests, and prescriptions 
awaiting transcription. 
 Movements: unnecessary movements that may generate a waste of time or, in some 
cases, even hurt people, such as repetitive searching for documents and supplies and 
nurses taking care of patients at multiple hospital floors.    
 Process defects, errors, and re-work:  generally defined as activities not adding value 
either to the process or to patients, such as medication errors, wrong-site surgery, 
improper labelling of specimens, using multiple sticks for blood draws, and injuries 
caused by either defective drugs or patient intolerances to specific treatments.   
FMEA and waste analysis are integrated into FMEA and Waste tables, which add the adverse 
events identified by the RBM to the process sheets developed in the second phase of the 
methodology.  
Each failure mode associated with an activity is characterized in FMEA tables by the 
following pieces of information (Figure 5): 
 failure mode code; 
 failure mode description; 
 risk sources, classified into internal and external ones, as discussed in the third step of 
the proposed methodology; 
 description of causes determining the failure;   
 effects; 
 most effective methods to detect the failure; 
 suggested improvement actions and degree of success of already taken measures. 
 
Take in Fig. 5. FMEA table 
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It is important to observe that causes determining failures can also be other failure modes. In 
this context, the 5 Whys method may be applied (Zidel, 2006). This is an approach enabling 
to explore cause and effect relationships by asking five questions, in order to determine the 
root causes of a failure mode. When multiple failure modes need to be considered to define 
patients’ exposure to risks, our methodology links them through the logical AND operator.          
Also, failure mode effects are classified into immediate and final ones. The first ones include 
all those effects impacting on the analysed organization, thus increasing costs and waste, but 
not affecting patients. The second ones are those impacting on patients, both directly and 
indirectly through correlation with other failure modes.      
Waste tables (Figure 6) rely on six of the healthcare sources of waste defined based on the 
Toyota Production System principles: overproduction, waiting times, transportation, 
overprocessing, queues/stock, and movements. The seventh source of waste, process defects, 
errors, and re-work, concerns all those situations in which the occurring of failure modes may 
cause an activity to be performed again, with consequent greater cycle times and costs. This 
kind of waste is not considered by Waste tables since it is already extensively analysed 
among failure modes in FMEA tables.        
As for failure modes, sources of waste may be classified into internal (related to organization, 
technology, communication, and structure) and external ones.   
 
Take in Fig. 6. Waste table 
 
Finally, both FMEA and Waste tables detail people in charge of detecting failure modes and 
waste and possible improvement actions. In addition, both the tables allow to keep trace of 
the success of corrective actions already undertaken. This because FMEA and waste analysis 
are not static approaches to be performed only once, but, on the contrary, they are recursive 
processes to be applied overtime to constantly monitor how system outcomes react to both 








5.  Applying the Methodology  to a Hospital Pharmacy Department  
In order to exemplify how the developed methodology should be used to analyse healthcare 
processes, its application to the drug management process at a hospital pharmacy department 
is detailed.  
This case was selected since drug and other material management is one of the most cross-
functional processes taking place in a hospital. In fact, it involves many activities performed 
by different departments, including central pharmacy and operating rooms, starting from 
when materials are sourced from suppliers until they are employed to deliver care to patients. 
As a consequence, effectiveness and efficiency are strongly influenced by the way such 
process is globally managed. Some authors proved that logistics and sourcing costs represent 
a big portion of the total costs for a hospital (Linch, 1991). Moreover, adverse events due to 
incorrect drug administration (Adverse Drug Events) are common causes for injury among 
hospitalized patients and may be originated by any part of the drug management process 
(Cohen, 2007). Thus, we chose to analyse the logistics process of a pharmacy department 
since adverse events taking place downstream in the drug management process may find their 
root causes within this converging point for materials in a hospital.  
The present case study focuses on a 1,372 bed teaching hospital located in Torino (Italy). 
This is the oldest operating hospital in town, and the largest in Piedmont Region of Italy, 
spread over 142,000 square meters, 14 clinical departments, and 5,822 employees, with 1,030 
physicians and 2,063 nurses among them (Cagliano et al., 2009). Also, this is one of the most 
complex hospitals in Italy as far as organizational flows are concerned. To be more precise, 
the application of the proposed clinical risk management approach was aimed to study central 
pharmacy’s drug supply to the hospital wards, with the purpose of identifying possible 
sources of risk for patients and understanding failure modes and waste, thus stimulating an 
improvement in the overall level of service.   
 
1. Context analysis 
First of all, the working team in charge of analysing the logistics process of the Pharmacy 
Department was formed. It included both the authors and hospital representatives. 
Expert knowledge elicitation was performed by interviewing pharmacists and logistics 
managers. Gathered information, as well as provided documentation, allowed to analyse all 
the procedures currently in place for the portion of drug process managed by the Pharmacy. 
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In addition, operational activities were directly observed. In this phase the working team was 
able to uncover the main issues that were deepened by the later steps of the methodology.  
 
2. Process mapping 
The ABS and the flow charts describing both operational and informational flows revealed 
three phases in the investigated process. First, after physicians prescribe therapies, floor 
personnel in charge of material management requests necessary drugs and medical devices to 
the Pharmacy Department mainly thorough a computerized procedure (Material Request 
Issue by Floors). Second, in the Pharmacy Department, after approval by the chief 
pharmacist, requested materials are picked from shelves and placed into baskets to be 
delivered to floors by means of trolleys. In a similar way, orders are placed to suppliers after 
validation by the chief pharmacist. Incoming products are inspected to check their 
compliance with orders (Pharmacy Request and Material Management). Third, before leaving 
the Pharmacy Department, outgoing packages are checked by pharmacists, afterwards they 
reach the destination wards together with a copy of the order, and finally the material receipt 
confirmation is signed by ward personnel and filed in the Pharmacy Department (Material 
Request Fulfilment).   
Phases were in turn decomposed into activities to form an ABS (Figure 7). We decided to 
develop process sheets only for critical activities (see the application of the fourth phase of 
the methodology).   
 
Take in Fig. 7. ABS for drug management process 
 
3. Risk identification and assessment 
The previous phases of the methodology served as a basis to identify risks related to the 
process under consideration, particularly by combining the information gathered during 
Context analysis and Process mapping with the experience of the working team components 
about both risk and healthcare process management.  
In such a way, sources of risk were identified and classified according to a RBS. This 
structure was then intersected with elementary activities in the ABS to give the RBM for the 
drug management process at the Pharmacy Department. Developed RBS and RBM are 
presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.  
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Take in Fig. 8. RBS for drug management process 
 
Take in Fig. 9.a. RBM for drug management process (part 1) 
Take in Fig. 9.b. RBM for drug management process (part 2) 
Take in Fig. 9.c. RBM for drug management process (part 3) 
 
A first correlation between sources of risk and elementary activities was established by 
putting crosses in the corresponding RBM cells. The limited information available to the 
working team in this first application of the methodology did not allow to quantify risks by 
evaluating their probabilities of occurrence and their impacts on activities. However, the 
fourth step of the methodology may be applied also with a qualitative risk evaluation.   
 
4. Failure modes and waste analysis (FMEA-Waste analysis) 
The analysis of the RBM and further interviews to the Pharmacy management revealed that 8 
out of the 22 identified elementary activities may be considered critical so that it is worth 
investigating them by means of FMEA and Waste tables. They are namely Computerized 
Material Request Creation, Material Request Check and Validation, List Fulfilment & 
Material Picking, Material Packing, Material Storing, Outgoing Package Sample Quality 
Inspection, Material Delivery to Floors, and Product Transaction Registration. 
First, failure modes (FM) and kinds of waste (W) impacting critical activities were numbered 
according to the following notation: FM1, FM2,..., W1, W2,... After that, they were put in the 
corresponding RBM rows, under the sources of risk generating them (Figure  9). A same 
failure mode or kind of waste may appear multiple times in a RBM row if it may affect an 
activity as a consequence of more than one source of risk. 
The description of the application of the fourth step of the proposed methodology to the case 
will focus on List Fulfilment & Material Picking. Several failure modes and kinds of waste 
were defined for this activity.  
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the process sheet and the FMEA table for List Fulfilment & 
Material Picking activity. As far as the effects of failure modes are concerned, the symbol X 
means that the failure mode at issue has some kind of effect, whereas the logical AND 
operator indicates that a failure mode, together with other failure modes, has a final effect on 
patients. Following the discussion of some of the identified failure modes.  First of all, the 
misunderstanding of units expressing the quantities of materials wards order to the Pharmacy 
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Department is due to the fact that relevant information is often communicated verbally, and 
double-checking is sometimes impossible because of the heavy workloads to which resources 
working in this hospital department are subjected. The effects may be both immediate and 
final. As an improvement action, two different pharmacy operators should always double-
check units. Moreover, the picking of the wrong items to be delivered to floors is given by 
both technological and organizational issues. These may include the wrong identification of 
either warehouse location or package to be picked. Also this failure mode may have both 
immediate and final effects according to the risk source generating it, and can be prevented 
by the use of optical barcode reading. Finally, loosing picking lists is determined by 
organizational issues, such as the high number of picking lists received by the Pharmacy 
Department every day. Related effects do not affect patients but process time and costs, since 
they imply that picking lists are prepared again. As a consequence, improvement actions 
having picking lists follow a precise path within the Pharmacy Department are highly 
recommended.  
 
Take in Fig. 10. Process sheet for List Fulfilment & Material Picking 
 
Take in Fig. 11. FMEA table for List Fulfilment & Material Picking 
 
The analysis of List Fulfilment & Material Picking activity revealed the following kind of 
waste: useless motions by pharmacy operators (Figure 12). It is determined by both 
organizational issues (e.g. poor coordination among workers) and technological ones (e.g. 
wrong picking lists). The effect is the same: operators do not follow optimized paths, thus 
taking longer to pick items, with the risk of getting in one another’s way. As a solution, it is 
suggested to have a pharmacist, or another professional figure, monitor picking paths.   
It can be observed that for this activity, as well as for the other ones being analyzed, the 
number of failure modes is far greater than the number of kinds of waste. As a matter of fact, 
many potential sources of waste are related to the class ‘Process defects, errors, and re-work’, 
which, as explained before, is addressed by FMEA tables. Therefore, they are considered as 
failure modes. It is the case of loosing picking lists, which asks for additional operational 
activities such as reintegrating the stock of products that have been wrongly picked and 
delivering the correct materials to floors.      
 
Take in Fig. 12. Waste table for List Fulfilment & Material Picking 
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6. Discussion 
Based on the results of its application to the drug management process at a hospital 
pharmacy, strengths and weaknesses of the developed approach to clinical risk management 
are here discussed.   
First of all, the systemic feature of the suggested methodology is assured by the adoption of 
the RBM. The RBM frames all risk sources into the specific activities characterizing the 
process at issue. Furthermore, it gives a global view of criticalities, making it easy to define 
correlations among different failure modes in order to trace at the root all the determinants of 
adverse events. This is crucial in healthcare since the occurring of an adverse event that may 
hurt hospitalized patients is often linked to multiple interrelated failure modes giving rise to a 
failure mode chain. For example, in the drug management process, the administration of a 
wrong medicine may be due to a picking error by the pharmacy operator that has not been 
detected before the drug arrives at the patient’s bed (Hollnagel, 2004). The systemic 
perspective of the RBM enhances the effectiveness of FMEA because it supports a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relationships between causes and effects of failure 
modes. Furthermore, the RBM provides not only a systemic but also a schematic 
representation of criticalities, thus making the proposed methodology a valid communication 
tool for organizational members.            
In addition, the methodology revealed to be extremely flexible since it is able to work at 
different levels of detail according to the specific case and the information available.  
In the developed clinical risk management approach, first process criticalities are identified 
by means of a reactive analysis based on past adverse events. Usually, such events have not 
been recorded, thus expert knowledge elicitation is used to encourage the emergence of 
process actors’ experience about inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. As a further step, thanks 
to the mapping of the discrepancies in the system barriers (failure modes and kinds of waste), 
the RBM methodology, integrated with FMEA and waste analysis, is able to make operators 
aware of both risks and waste existing in a healthcare process. Therefore, in a sense, the 
proposed methodology also constitutes a valid tool for stimulating a structured analysis of 
criticalities, which is absolutely important in a highly human based context like the healthcare 
one.  
Moreover, the present framework could support decision makers in setting correct priority 
areas for intervention and may be a part of Health Technology Assessment programs. This is 
guaranteed by the identification of improvement actions in the last step of the method.  
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Finally, the developed clinical risk management method may be applied overtime to review 
the effectiveness of the implementation of corrective actions to limit risks and waste. To this 
end, the RBM and FMEA and Waste tables will be updated, and, if necessary, new corrective 
actions will be developed and adopted. As a consequence, the RBM and FMEA and Waste 
tables also prove to be useful means of communication among people involved in the 
improvement process.     
The implementation of the methodology in the case hospital revealed great difficulty in 
gathering all the pieces of information necessary to fully apply the four steps, due to a scarce 
aptitude for risk management and, as a consequence, for supporting such a comprehensive 
organizational analysis by both personnel and informational systems. As a matter of fact, this 
first application to the logistics process of a pharmacy department was limited to risk 
identification, without performing any quantitative evaluations.  To this end, it stimulated an 
increase in the level of maturity towards risk of the studied organization, thus enabling future 
deeper analyses.     
Overall, the application of the proposed methodology may serve as a first step towards a 
deeper understanding of risk and waste in healthcare processes and the definition of the most 
appropriate measures to reduce them. It may be the foundation of a quantitative risk 
evaluation by numerically determining the probabilities of occurrence of risks as well as their 
impacts on process activities.  
However, in order to prove the full benefits and limitations of the suggested approach and 
understand if it requires further conceptual refinements, an extensive application to a variety 
of healthcare settings is needed. 
The flexibility of our methodology potentially allows the integration with risk management 
approaches already established in the healthcare sector, such as for instance Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and Incident Reporting (Armitage 
et al., 2007; Lyons, 2009). These techniques may work at the level of single RBM cells by 
performing either qualitative (e.g. HAZOP, Incident Reporting) or quantitative analyses (e.g. 
Montecarlo simulation), according to the availability of data and the degree of organizational 
maturity towards risk management. Also, multiple RBM cells may be considered in order to 
understand the root causes of a failure mode or of a kind of waste. FTA could be applied for 
this purpose, since it is not limited to the investigation of a single system but usually crosses 
system boundaries. To be more precise, FTA would break down the top event to find out the 
parallel and sequential combinations of basic faults responsible for it. To this end, the use of 
logical operators to link failure modes in FMEA tables is a first attempt to correlate different 
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risky events. Moreover, the role that Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) could have in the 
approach as pre-warning signals anticipating the occurrence of adverse events should be 
investigated. In particular, RBM cells could be associated with proper metrics able to capture 
the impact of the symptoms of a risk source manifestation on the performance of a given 
activity.   
Although combing the mentioned approaches with our methodology increases the knowledge 
about the origins of patients’ exposure to risks and allows a better planning of proper 
countermeasures, it may require healthcare organizations additional efforts to develop new 
skills about the management of risk and safety. Nevertheless, we believe that this stream of 
research deserves future attention because it contributes to enhance the suitability of the 
methodology discussed in the paper for a variety of settings.  
 
7. Summary 
The growing healthcare complexity requires management approaches taking into account 
multiple points of view. Based on Reason’s theory of failures, the paper suggests a 
methodology giving a systemic perspective on clinical risk by integrating existing tools 
coming from different fields, such as process mapping, project risk management, and quality 
management.  Moreover, because of the human-centred nature of healthcare systems, the 
steps of such methodology have been developed according to Human Reliability Assessment 
methods. 
The first application to the logistics process of a pharmacy department in a large hospital 
highlighted that our method can effectively support not only risk analysis, but also decision 
making, thus increasing organizations’ maturity towards clinical risk. Future research efforts 
will be focused on an extensive test of the presented approach in various healthcare contexts.      
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PROCESS PHASE PROCESS ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION CODE 
1. Material Request Issue by Floors 
Starting the Computerized Material Request Procedure ABS 1.1 
Computerized Material Request Creation ABS 1.2 
Material Request Check and Validation ABS 1.3 
Sending Material Requests to Pharmacy ABS 1.4 
2. Pharmacy Request and Material 
Management 
Material Request Receiving ABS 2.1 
Material Request Validation by Pharmacists ABS 2.2 
Substituting Therapeutic Equivalents for Unavailable Products ABS 2.3 
Defining Picking Lists ABS 2.4 
List Fulfilment & Material Picking ABS 2.5 
Material Packing ABS 2.6 
Checking Reorder Levels for Products ABS 2.7 
Receiving Incoming Materials ABS 2.8 
Material Storing ABS 2.9 
Incoming Material Data Entry ABS 2.10 
Filing Incoming Material Documents ABS 2.11 
Returning Products to Suppliers ABS 2.12 
3. Material Request Fulfilment 
Preparing Trolleys for Delivery to Floors ABS 3.1 
Outgoing Package Sample Quality Inspection ABS 3.2 
Material Delivery to Floors ABS 3.3 
Checking Pending Material Requests ABS 3.4 
Material Receiving by Floors ABS 3.5 
Product Transaction Registration ABS 3.6 
 LEVEL 0 LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3 LEVEL 4 RBS CODE 







Planning Activities RBS 1.1 
Planned Work 
Schedule RBS 1.2 






Training/Know How RBS 1.5 
Availability of 











Kinds of Products RBS 1.9 
Determining Product 
Quantity RBS 1.10 
Computerized 
Procedures RBS 1.11 
Transcription RBS 1.12 
Stocking Products RBS 1.13 
Moving Products RBS 1.14 
2. Technology 
Information System 
Continuity of Service RBS 2.1 
Intranet RBS 2.2 
Data Transfer RBS 2.3 
Data Backup and 
Network Records RBS 2.4 
Managing Antivirus RBS 2.5 
Equipment 
Handling Systems RBS 2.6 
Revolving Shelves RBS 2.7 
Elevators RBS 2.8 
Computers and 
Palmtops RBS 2.9 
Boxes for Delivering 








Quantity RBS 3.2 





Variations RBS 3.4 
Feedback RBS 3.5 




Maintenance Plans RBS 4.1 
Extraordinary 
Maintenance Plans RBS 4.2 
Workplace Safety RBS 4.3 
Networks 
Service Interruptions RBS 4.4 
Service Continuity RBS 4.5 
External Risk 
Sources 
5. Product Supplying 
Delivery Lead Times 
 
RBS 5.1 
Delivery Points RBS 5.2 
Quality of Delivered 
Products RBS 5.3 
Documentation 
Management RBS 5.4 
Delivered Items RBS 5.5 
6. Finance Supplier Assets  RBS 6.1 Contract Specifications RBS 6.2 
7. Environment 




Social Issues RBS 7.2 
Epidemiological Events RBS 7.3 






RBS FOR PHARMACY LOGISTICS PROCESS 
ORGANIZATION 










































































ABS1.1 Starting the Computerized Material Request Procedure    x  x     x    
ABS1.2 Computerized Material Request Creation    FM1 FM1    W1 W1     
ABS1.3 Material Request Check and Validation    W1 x W1 FM1; W1  W1 x FM1    










































ABS2.1 Material Request Receiving x x x x 
ABS2.2 Material Request Validation by Pharmacists  x   x x x  x x x    
ABS2.3 Substituting Therapeutic Equivalents for Unavailable Products     x x   x x x    
ABS2.4 Defining Picking Lists x x x x 
ABS2.5 List Fulfilment & Material Picking W1 W1 W1  
FM4; 
FM6 FM7 FM4 W1     FM2  
ABS2.6 Material Packaging W1 W1 W1 FM2 FM4 FM1 W1 FM1 
ABS2.7 Checking Reorder Levels for Products x   x x x x  x x     
ABS2.8 Receiving Incoming Materials x x x x x x x x x x 




FM2   FM2   FM2  
ABS2.10 Incoming Material Data Entry x x x x 
ABS2.11 Filing Incoming Material Documents x x 





























ABS3.1 Preparing Trolleys for Delivery to Floors  x x  x x  x     x  
ABS3.2 Outgoing Package Sample Quality Inspection      FM2 FM2  FM2 FM2     
ABS3.3 Material Delivery to Floors FM4;W1 FM2 FM2 FM5 
ABS3.4 Checking Pending Material Requests x x x 
ABS3.5 Material Receiving by Floors x x x x 








RBS FOR PHARMACY LOGISTICS PROCESS 
TECHNOLOGY COMMUNICATION 






























































 ABS1.1 Starting the Computerized Material Request Procedure  x       x        
ABS1.2 Computerized Material Request Creation W1 x x FM1 x 
ABS1.3 Material Request Check and Validation x x x x FM1; FM2 x x W1 x x 










































ABS2.1 Material Request Receiving x x x x 
ABS2.2 Material Request Validation by Pharmacists x x x x x x x x 
ABS2.3 Substituting Therapeutic Equivalents for Unavailable Products           x x x x x x 
ABS2.4 Defining Picking Lists x x x 
ABS2.5 List Fulfilment & Material Picking FM2; FM6 FM1; FM3 FM1; FM5 
ABS2.6 Material Packaging FM3 
ABS2.7 Checking Reorder Levels for Products x x x x x 
ABS2.8 Receiving Incoming Materials x x x 
ABS2.9 Material Storing FM3 
ABS2.10 Incoming Material Data Entry x x x x 
ABS2.11 Filing Incoming Material Documents 





























ABS3.1 Preparing Trolleys for Delivery to Floors x x 
ABS3.2 Outgoing Package Sample Quality Inspection FM1 
ABS3.3 Material Delivery to Floors FM1 x FM3 
ABS3.4 Checking Pending Material Requests x x 
ABS3.5 Material Receiving by Floors x x 
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ABS1.1 Starting the Computerized Material Request Procedure x x x x 
ABS1.2 Computerized Material Request Creation x x x x 
ABS1.3 Material Request Check and Validation x x x x 










































ABS2.1 Material Request Receiving x x 
ABS2.2 Material Request Validation by Pharmacists x x x 
ABS2.3 Substituting Therapeutic Equivalents for Unavailable Products             x  x x 
ABS2.4 Defining Picking Lists x x 
ABS2.5 List Fulfilment & Material Picking FM6 
ABS2.6 Material Packaging x x 
ABS2.7 Checking Reorder Levels for Products x 
ABS2.8 Receiving Incoming Materials x x x x x x x x x x 
ABS2.9 Material Storing FM3 FM3 FM2 x 
ABS2.10 Incoming Material Data Entry x x x x 
ABS2.11 Filing Incoming Material Documents 





























ABS3.1 Preparing Trolleys for Delivery to Floors 
ABS3.2 Outgoing Package Sample Quality Inspection 
ABS3.3 Material Delivery to Floors FM1 FM1 x x 
ABS3.4 Checking Pending Material Requests 
ABS3.5 Material Receiving by Floors 
ABS3.6 Product Transaction Registration FM3 FM2 
 
Fig.9c 
 PHASE ACTIVITY 2.5 List Fulfilment &  Material Picking 
2. Pharmacy Request 
and Material 
Management 
Process Actors Warehouse personnel 
Inputs Picking lists (both computer and paper based) 
Description 
Warehouse personnel prepare materials 
requested by floors according to picking 
lists. This task is performed by 
following a logistics path allowing 
optimizing the sequence of picking 
operations 
Duration and Frequency According to the defined schedule 
Tests Matching between requested quantities and delivered ones. 
Tools Revolving shelves Forklifts 











































Lack of both verbal 
and written 
communication 









X AND Floor personnel  
FM2 
Picking of the wrong 
items to be delivered 
to floors 






Products difficult to 
be identified (e.g. 
similar packages; 
same packages, but 
different dosage) 
--- AND Floor personnel Use of optical barcode reading 
FM3 
Documentation not 
updated according to 
changes in quantities 
requested by floors. 
C 
No communication 
about changes in 
quantities requested 
by floors 
X --- Administrative control  
FM4 
Lack of controls on 

















Having operators be 
supported by 
qualified personnel. 
FM5 Loosing picking lists O 
High number of 
picking lists received 
by the Pharmacy 





Having picking lists 
follow a precise path 
within the Pharmacy 
Department 
Confusion X ---  
FM6 Machine breakdowns T 
Inadequate 











































































Having a pharmacist, 
or another 
professional figure, 
monitor both picking 
paths and task 
assignment 
 













Having a pharmacist, 
or another 
professional figure, 
monitor picking 
paths 
 
 
 
Fig.12 
 
 
 
 
 
